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I. Introduction 
On August 8, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California held in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association1 that the NCAA rules that prevent men’s 
college basketball and football players from controlling the 
commercial rights to their names and likenesses “unreasonably 
restrain trade in the market for certain educational and athletic 
opportunities offered by NCAA Division I schools.”2 The court 
then issued an injunction preventing the NCAA from restraining 
its members from compensating their men’s basketball and 
football players up to $5,000 per year for the use of their 
likenesses.3 The court further enjoined the NCAA from 
prohibiting monetary awards to college athletes in the amounts 
                                                                                                     
 1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C-09-
3329-CW, 2014 WL 3899815 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014). 
 2. Id. at *2. 
 3. See Permanent Injunction at 1, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (enjoining the NCAA from prohibiting player 
compensation).   
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up to “the full cost of attending the respective NCAA member 
school.”4 
The O’Bannon decision is an important step forward for both 
college-athletes’ rights and sports law jurisprudence because it 
recognizes that NCAA rules limiting college-athlete pay may 
violate section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.5 Nevertheless, the 
ruling’s impact is tempered by the iconoclastic nature of the 
court’s injunction, which limits the immediate potential for 
college-athlete compensation beyond a nominal amount.6 At the 
same time, the ruling seems to ignore the broader implications of 
NCAA restraints on third-party markets for licensing celebrities’ 
likenesses for endorsements—restraints that federal courts 
eventually must overturn.7  
This Article explains why the district court decision in 
O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association was correct 
to hold that the NCAA unreasonably restrained trade by 
preventing athletes from sharing revenues derived from the use 
of their names and likenesses, but too narrow in its injunction 
that only mandated the NCAA to allow compensation through a 
deferred trust in amounts up to $5,000 per year. Part II of this 
article provides the procedural history of O’Bannon v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association—a case that many believed would 
fundamentally change the nature of college-athletes’ rights in 
America.8 Part III explains the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in the O’Bannon bench trial, and discusses the court’s 
                                                                                                     
 4. Id. at 2; see also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 1, 
at 20 (explaining that the “gap between the full grant-in-aid,” which represents 
the full cost of attending a respective school “and the cost of attendance varies 
from school to school but is typically a few thousand dollars”). 
 5. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 1, at 1–2 
(finding that NCAA rules barring student-athletes from receiving revenue 
earned from the use of their “names, images, and likenesses in videogames, live 
game telecasts, and other footage . . . unreasonably restrain trade in the market 
for certain educational and athletic opportunities offered by NCAA Division I 
schools”); see also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared 
to be illegal.”). 
 6. See infra notes 81–88 and accompanying text (discussing the 
permanent injunction in greater detail).  
 7. See infra notes 109–28 and accompanying text (discussing why the 
permanent injunction does not fully ameliorate NCAA restraints).  
 8. Infra Part II. 
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permanent injunction issued against the NCAA.9 Part IV 
explains why the district court in O’Bannon was legally correct to 
find the NCAA’s restraints on sharing revenues with college 
athletes violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.10 Part V explains 
why the permanent injunction issued by the court in O’Bannon 
does not fully ameliorate the NCAA’s restraints.11 Finally, Part 
VI discusses the logical next steps that could follow the district 
court’s decision in O’Bannon, including the possibility of an 
appeal by both parties, follow-up lawsuits seeking to further 
dismantle the NCAA’s amateurism rules, player unionization 
efforts, Title IX compliance issues, and a petition by the NCAA to 
Congress for a broad-based antitrust exemption to fully preserve 
its longstanding restraints on college-athlete pay.12 
II. A Trial More Than Five Years in the Making: The Procedural 
History in O’Bannon v. NCAA 
A. Pleadings and Early Decisions 
The recent bench trial in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association represents the culmination of more than five 
years of litigation by elite men’s basketball and football players 
against the NCAA.13 This litigation began on June 21, 2009 when 
twelve former NCAA football and men’s basketball players, led by 
                                                                                                     
 9. Infra Part III. 
 10. Infra Part IV. 
 11. Infra Part V. 
 12. Infra Part VI. 
 13. See infra notes 14–48 and accompanying text (summarizing the 
procedural history). For further discussion of the case history in O’Bannon v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association, see Marc Edelman, The Future of 
Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA 
Student-Athlete Name & Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of 
College Sports, 92 OR. L. REV. 1019, 1033–36 (2014) (discussing the O’Bannon 
case history more thoroughly); Daniel E. Lazaroff, An Antitrust Exemption for 
the NCAA: Sound Policy or Letting the Fox Loose in the Henhouse?, 41 PEPP. L. 
REV. 229, 235 (2014) (providing a concise procedural history of the O’Bannon 
case); Michael McCann, Ed O’Bannon v. NCAA Class Certification Hearing 
Primer, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, http://www.si.com/college-football/2013/06/19/ 
ncaa-ed-obannon-hearing-primer (last updated May 28, 2014) (last visited Nov. 
18, 2014) (providing an overview of the case’s procedural history in more 
colloquial language) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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former UCLA basketball standout Ed O’Bannon, filed an 
antitrust complaint against the college sports trade association in 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.14 
The complaint alleged, in pertinent part, that NCAA members 
“conspired to fix the price of former student athletes’ images at 
zero and . . . boycott former student athletes in the collegiate 
licensing market.”15 The complaint further alleged that “these 
restraints occurred within a product market for live broadcasts, 
various kinds of non-live game video footage, and college sports 
videogames.”16  
Since the filing of this antitrust complaint, the plaintiffs’ case 
has morphed “like Heraclitus’s river: always changing, yet always 
the same.”17 On January 15, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California consolidated the substance of the 
complaint in O’Bannon with that of another lawsuit before the 
same court, Keller v. Electronic Arts.18 “The Keller litigation had 
asserted claims against the NCAA, the College Licensing 
Company (the NCAA’s independent licensing arm), and the 
videogame developer Electronic Arts, all related to an alleged 
conspiracy to violate student-athletes’ publicity rights in college 
sports videogames.”19 The central link between the two cases was 
that, in Keller, one of Electronic Arts’s affirmative defenses was 
that “the NCAA granted it the rights to use student-athlete 
likenesses.”20 “Meanwhile, in the early stages of O’Bannon, the 
NCAA denied having granted any such rights to third parties.”21 
                                                                                                     
 14. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1033; see also Complaint at 2–8, O’Bannon 
v. NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW (N.D. Cal. Jul. 21, 2009) (stating plaintiffs’ 
antitrust claims); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig., No. C-09-1967-CW, 2011 WL 1642256, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011) 
(discussing the procedural history).  
 15. Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motions to Dismiss at 9, O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW, 2010 WL 445190, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010); see 
also In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 2011 WL 
1642256, at *2 (stating the antitrust violations alleged in the complaint).  
 16. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1033 (citing Complaint, supra note 14, at 
62–67).  
 17. Id. at 1034 (quoting Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football 
Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1994)).  
 18. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 19. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 20. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 21. Id. (citing Jon Solomon, NCAA Knew EA Sports Videogames Used Real 
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After the court consolidated O’Bannon and Keller into a 
single litigation known as the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litigation, “the plaintiffs then filed an 
amended complaint and moved for class certification—a motion” 
that was vehemently opposed by the NCAA.22 “Thereafter, the 
court notified the plaintiffs that they would need to add at least 
one current student-athlete to their complaint” to avoid 
dismissal—a result that “led the plaintiffs to file a third amended 
complaint adding six current student-athletes as named 
plaintiffs.”23 
“[B]efore the court could review this third amended 
complaint, the plaintiffs [from the Keller case] entered into 
settlement negotiations with both Electronic Arts and the College 
Licensing Company, which led to the filing of a stipulation of 
settlement.”24 This settlement “left the court to review the merits 
                                                                                                     
Players, E-mails from Ed O’Bannon Lawsuit Show, AL.COM, http://www.al.com/ 
sports/index.ssf/2012/11/ncaa_knew_ea_sports_video_game.html (last updated 
Nov. 12, 2012) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (quoting NCAA spokesperson Erik 
Christianson as stating that “the NCAA never marketed student-athlete 
likeness[es]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 22. Id. at 1034–35 (footnote omitted); see also Tom Fornelli, Court Asks 
O’Bannon’s Lawyers to Add Current Players to Lawsuit, CBSSPORTS.COM, 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-collegefootball/22498428/ 
obannons-lawyers-asked-to-add-current-players-to-lawsuit (last updated June 
21, 2013) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (stating that “[t]he NCAA maintains the 
lawsuit should not be a class-action lawsuit because the claims of thousands of 
college athletes are different and should not be treated the same”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 23. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1035 (footnote omitted); see also Steve 
Berkowitz, Judge Will Allow Current Player to Join O’Bannon Suit, USA TODAY, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/07/05/ed-obannon-ncaa-
likeness-lawsuit/2492981 (last updated July 5, 2013) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) 
(discussing the court ruling requiring the plaintiffs to add at least one current 
college athlete as a named plaintiff) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 24. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1035 (footnote omitted); see also Order 
Denying Motions to Dismiss at 1, 7, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013); cf. 
Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, William H. Lyons & Kevin N. Rask, What’s in a Name? 
The Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate Model, and the Treatment of Student-
Athletes, 92 OR. L. REV. 879, 911 (2014) (noting that the settlement was no 
surprise because Electronic Arts’s claim that its videogames were entitled to 
First Amendment protection had already been denied by two different federal 
circuit courts). 
DISTRICT COURT DECISION IN O’BANNON 2325 
of the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims only vis-à-vis the NCAA.”25 “[O]n 
November 8, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California [then] certified a class to pursue injunctive 
relief against the NCAA” based upon the antitrust claims that 
were originally pled in the O’Bannon complaint.26 The certified 
class included: 
All current and former student-athletes residing in the United 
States who compete on, or competed on, an NCAA Division 
I . . . college or university men’s basketball team or on an 
NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision . . . men’s football team and 
whose images, likenesses, and/or names may be, or have been, 
included in game footage or in videogames licensed or sold by 
[the NCAA], their co-conspirators, or their licensees after the 
conclusion of the athlete’s participation in intercollegiate 
athletics.27 
“The court did not certify a damages subclass.” 28 
B. Summary Judgment Motions 
Plaintiffs and the NCAA thereafter filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.29 Plaintiffs urged the court to find the 
                                                                                                     
 25. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1035 (citing Order Denying Motions to 
Dismiss, supra note 24, at 8–24). 
 26. Id. at 1035–36 (citing Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 
Motion for Class Certification at 5–16, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5979327, at *3–7 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 8, 2013)).  
 27. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Class 
Certification at 23, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5979327, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013). 
 28. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1036 (footnote omitted); see also Order 
Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting Motion to Amend 
Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration 
at 4, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C  
09-1967 CW (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014) (noting that “[t]he Court granted 
Plaintiffs’ request to certify the injunctive relief class but denied their request to 
certify a damages subclass, citing various barriers to class manageability”). 
 29. See Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting 
Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for 
Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 4 (“On November 15, 2013, one week after 
the class certification order issued, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for 
summary judgment. The NCAA cross-moved for summary judgment one month 
later.”).  
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NCAA’s restraints on college-athlete compensation illegal 
because they alleged that the procompetitive justifications for the 
restraints lacked any bona fide economic merit.30 Meanwhile, the 
NCAA urged the court, among other things, to find the 
procompetitive effects of their restraints on college-athlete pay 
sufficient to dismiss the case in its entirety.31 For the most part, 
the court dismissed both parties’ summary judgment motions, 
albeit the court did rule in favor of the plaintiffs with respect to 
one of the NCAA’s alleged procompetitive justifications.32 
The court opined that in order to prevail on a restraint of 
trade claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiffs 
needed to prove three elements: “(1) that there was a contract, 
combination, or conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably 
restrained trade under . . . rule of reason analysis; and (3) that 
the restraint affected interstate commerce.”33 With the court 
having already concluded in earlier proceedings that the first and 
third elements of such a claim were met, the cross-motions for 
summary judgment focused exclusively on the second element: 
the restraint’s competitive effects.34 
                                                                                                     
 30. See id. at 29–41 (disputing the NCAA’s purported procompetitive 
justifications).  
 31. See id. (analyzing the NCAA’s justifications, including “(1) the 
preservation of amateurism in college sports; (2) promoting competitive balance 
among Division I teams; (3) the integration of education and athletics; 
(4) increased support for women’s sports and less prominent men’s sports; and 
(5) greater output of Division I football and basketball”). 
 32. See id. at 47 (“Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment that the 
NCAA’s fourth asserted justification for the challenged restraint—increased 
support for women’s sports and less prominent men’s sports—is not legitimately 
procompetitive.”). 
 33. Id. at 7 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
id. at 8–9 (explaining why the rule of reason was the most appropriate standard 
under the second prong of the court’s test). See generally Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”). It is worth further noting that 
while these three requirements are recognized by all circuits, they are often 
stated somewhat differently, with the first and third being grouped together 
into what are often called “threshold requirements.” See, e.g., Edelman, supra 
note 13, at 1037 (referencing the “threshold requirements” to a section 1 
Sherman Act claim); Marc Edelman, The NCAA’s “Death Penalty Sanction”—
Reasonable Self-Governance or an Illegal Group Boycott in Disguise?, 18 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 385, 394 (2014) (same). 
 34. See Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting 
Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for 
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The court further explained that, with respect to the 
competitive effects element of an antitrust violation, longstanding 
Ninth Circuit precedent has held that “[a] restraint violates the 
rule of reason if the restraint’s harm to competition outweighs its 
procompetitive effects” based on “a burden-shifting framework.”35 
Under this burden-shifting framework, the court explained that 
the “plaintiff[s] bear[] the initial burden of showing that the 
restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within a 
relevant market.”36 If the plaintiffs meet this burden, the 
defendants then must produce evidence of the restraint’s 
procompetitive benefits.37 Meanwhile, if the defendants produce 
sufficient evidence of procompetitive effects, the plaintiffs finally 
must “show that any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a 
substantially less restrictive manner.”38 
Applying this three-step approach, the court in O’Bannon 
concluded that the plaintiffs met their initial burden of showing 
that the NCAA’s restraints on athlete pay produced a significant 
                                                                                                     
Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 9–14 (analyzing the parties’ arguments 
regarding the competitive effects of the NCAA’s restraints on student-athletes’ 
pay). See generally Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 1, at 48 
(“The NCAA does not dispute that [its challenged] rules were enacted and are 
enforced pursuant to an agreement among its Division I member schools and 
conferences. Nor does it dispute that these rules affect interstate commerce. 
Accordingly, the only remaining question here is whether the challenged rules 
restrain trade unreasonably.”). 
 35. Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting 
Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for 
Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 7 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 
F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This 
burden-shifting framework has been adopted by most, but not all courts; the 
practical realities of how courts apply the framework is discussed in detail by 
esteemed antitrust-law professor Michael Carrier in his article The Rule of 
Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century. See Michael A. Carrier, The 
Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 827, 829–36 (2009) (exploring instances of courts applying the 
burden-shifting framework).  
 36. Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting 
Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for 
Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 7 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 
F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 37. See id. (citing Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 
2001)) (stating the second part of the burden-shifting framework).  
 38. Id. at 7–8 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th 
Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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anticompetitive effect within the two relevant markets: “the 
‘college education’ market and the ‘group licensing’ market”39—a 
burden that is met by less than 3% of all antitrust plaintiffs.40 
The court then reviewed whether the NCAA met its burden of 
producing evidence related to procompetitive benefits of its 
restraints on athlete pay from the use of their names, images, 
and likenesses.41 In this vein, the court analyzed five purported 
procompetitive effects alleged by the NCAA: (1) preserving 
amateurism in college sports; (2) promoting competitive balance 
among Division I teams; (3) the increased output benefits in 
college sports; (4) increased integration of education and 
                                                                                                     
 39. See id. at 9–11 (discussing the court’s reasoning for determining that 
the plaintiffs’ had offered “sufficiently plausible evidence of anticompetitive 
effects” in both markets).  
 40. See Carrier, supra note 35, at 828 (noting that “[c]ourts dispose of 97% 
of cases at the first stage” of burden-shifting—the showing of an anticompetitive 
effect). In finding that plaintiffs had met their initial burden with respect to the 
group licensing market, the court concluded that there was indeed a real 
possibility that such a market existed because, absent the NCAA’s restraints, 
the plaintiffs had cognizable rights of publicity, and these rights were not 
preempted by the First Amendment. See Order Resolving Cross-Motions for 
Summary Judgment, Granting Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying 
Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 15–29 
(analyzing the existence and scope of a group-licensing market). For further 
information about college athletes’ publicity rights, see Marc Edelman, Closing 
the “Free Speech” Loophole: The Case for Protecting College Athletes’ Publicity 
Rights in Commercial Video Games, 65 FLA. L. REV. 553, 567–84 (2013) 
(discussing in detail college athletes’ publicity rights and their balance against 
First Amendment considerations). Even with respect to the use of college 
athletes’ likenesses in live television broadcasts, the court concluded that “the 
First Amendment does not guarantee . . . an unfettered right to broadcast entire 
sporting events without regard for the participating athletes’ rights of 
publicity.” Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting 
Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for 
Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 16 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. 
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563–64, 574–76 (1977)). See generally id. at 20 
There is no principled reason why the First Amendment would allow 
the NCAA to restrict press access to college football and basketball 
games (via exclusive licensing agreements) but, at the same time, 
prohibit student-athletes from doing the same (via right-of-publicity 
actions) . . . . As far as the First Amendment is concerned, these 
rights stand on equal footing. 
 41. See Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Granting 
Motion to Amend Class Definition, Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for 
Reconsideration, supra note 28, at 29–41 (analyzing the NCAA’s procompetitive 
justifications). 
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athletics; and (5) increased viability of maintaining less popular 
men’s sports and women’s sports.42  
The court held that the NCAA’s purported procompetitive 
justification of maintaining less popular men’s sports and 
women’s sports failed as a matter of law, and awarded summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs on that argument.43 However, the court 
denied both parties’ summary judgment motions with respect to 
all other affirmative defenses, recognizing that each defense 
entailed unresolved issues of fact.44 Most notably, the court 
opined that the NCAA could prevail on its amateurism defense if 
it could factually prove that maintaining amateurism increased 
overall consumer demand for college sports.45 Meanwhile, the 
NCAA could prevail on its argument that no-pay rules promote 
the integration of education and athletics if it could demonstrate 
that this integration would actually enhance the quality of 
student athletes’ educational experience.46 
                                                                                                     
 42. See id. at 29 (describing the five procompetitive effects). 
 43. See id. at 38–40 (finding that the NCAA’s purported defense “is not a 
legitimate procompetitive justification” because competition cannot be foreclosed 
with respect to a particular sector of the economy simply to promote competition 
within a different economic sector (citing United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 
U.S. 596, 610 (1972))). In addition, as the court explained in its discussion of the 
integration of education and athletics defense, a restraint of trade may not be 
justified on the basis of social or public policy goals. See id. at 36 (“[A]ntitrust 
defendants cannot rely on these types of social welfare benefits to justify 
anticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Act.” (citing FTC v. Superior Court 
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990))).  
 44. See id. at 29–41 (noting conflicting evidence regarding the purported 
procompetitive benefits of preserving amateurism, promoting competitive 
balance among teams, fostering integration of education and athletics, and 
increasing output benefits in college sports).  
 45. See id. (noting that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the 
challenged rules serve the procompetitive purpose of promoting amateurism). 
 46. See id. at 36–38 (indicating that the NCAA would need to present 
evidence at trial to show that “(1) the ban on student-athlete compensation 
actually contributes to the integration of education and athletics and (2) the 
integration of education and athletics enhances competition in the ‘college 
education’ or ‘group licensing’ market”). Relying on Supreme Court decisions 
such as National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, which have 
held that social welfare benefits may not justify otherwise anticompetitive 
conduct, the court explained that the NCAA’s integration of education with 
athletics argument could prevail only if the integration actually promoted 
competition within the relevant market. Id. at 36.  
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Recognizing these outstanding issues of fact, the court then 
ordered a pretrial conference and jury trial on the outstanding 
issues.47 The plaintiffs thereafter waived their right to trial by 
jury, and instead opted for a bench trial before Judge Wilken.48 
III. The District Court’s Ruling at Trial 
The bench trial in O’Bannon v. NCAA spanned three weeks—
beginning on Monday, June 9, 2014, and culminating on Friday, 
June 27, 2014.49 On August 8th, Judge Wilken issued her ruling 
in the form of a ninety-nine page “findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.” 50 At the same time, the court entered a judgment in favor 
of the class action plaintiffs, and ordered a permanent injunction 
against the NCAA.51  
A. Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
The court’s decision, in summary, found that “the challenged 
NCAA rules unreasonably restrained trade in the market for 
certain educational and athletic opportunities offered by NCAA 
Division I schools.”52 The decision further held that the 
procompetitive justifications that the NCAA offered did not 
                                                                                                     
 47. See id. at 48 (describing the court’s order). 
 48. See Sara Ganim, As Testimony Starts in Former College Star’s Suit, 
NCAA Settles Another Suit, CNN (June 9, 2014), http://www.cnn. 
com/2014/06/09/us/ed-obannon-ncaa-lawsuit (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (noting 
that “the plaintiffs gave up their request for monetary damages in exchange for 
a bench trial, meaning there will be no jury, and the judge will make the 
decision”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 49. O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW, 2014 WL 3899815, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 8, 2014). 
 50. Id. at *1–99. 
 51. Permanent Injunction at 1–2, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C-09-3329-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014); see 
Judgment at *1, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) 
(stating that a judgment in the case “is hereby entered in favor of the Class 
Plaintiff, and the Plaintiffs recover from Defendant National Collegiate Athletic 
Association their costs of action”). 
 52. O’Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at *2. 
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justify the NCAA’s restraints, and these restraints could have 
been achieved through less restrictive means.53 
1. Relevant Markets and Anticompetitive Effects of NCAA Rules 
The court first concluded that plaintiffs presented 
sufficient evidence to show that the NCAA’s restraints on 
competition in the college education market yielded bona fide 
anticompetitive effects.54 With respect to the alleged relevant 
markets and anticompetitive effects in those markets, the 
court found that the evidence presented established that NCAA 
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision schools (“FBS football 
schools”) and the Division I men’s basketball schools “compete 
to recruit the best high school football and basketball 
players.”55 In addition, the court found that “FBS football and 
Division I basketball schools are the only suppliers of the 
unique bundles of goods and services described above.”56   
Based upon these findings, the court then concluded that 
“absent the challenged NCAA rules, teams of FBS football and 
Division I basketball players would be able to compete for the 
services of college athletes by offering them a share of the 
revenues derived from the use of their names, images, or 
likenesses in various forms.”57 However, because of the NCAA’s 
current rules, athletes at FBS football schools and Division I 
men’s basketball schools have been precluded from selling 
                                                                                                     
 53. See id. (describing the limits of the NCAA restraints). 
 54. See id. at *78 (“Because Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to 
show that the NCAA’s rules impose a restraint on competition in the college 
education market, the Court must determine whether that restraint is 
justified.”). 
 55. Id. at *7–8; see also id. at *12 (concluding that “there are no 
professional football or basketball leagues capable of supplying a substitute for 
the bundle of goods and services that FBS football and Division I basketball 
schools provide”). 
 56. Id. at *8; see also id. at *11–12 (finding that NFL and NBA teams are 
not an alternative market to college sports because they do not permit players to 
enter their league directly after high school and, furthermore, that minor league 
sports teams are not alternative markets because “recruits do not typically 
pursue opportunities in those leagues”). 
 57. Id. at *16, *19. 
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their services in the United States, if not the world.58 In a legal 
sense, this finding represented an anticompetitive restraint of 
trade within this college education market.59  
2. Alleged Procompetitive Benefits of the NCAA Rules 
Once the court found the plaintiffs to have met their 
burden of proving anticompetitive effects within a relevant 
antitrust market, the district court next turned to whether the 
NCAA was able to prove a procompetitive benefit within the 
same market.60 Upon review of the evidence, the court fully 
rejected two of the defendants’ procompetitive justifications—
one based on competitive balance, and the other based on a 
purported increase in the number of schools competing in FBS 
football and Division I men’s basketball.61 Nevertheless, two 
                                                                                                     
 58. See id. at *22 (explaining that in agreements with schools, the “recruit 
provides his athletic performance and the use of his name, image, and likeness. 
However, the schools agree to value the latter at zero by agreeing not to compete 
with each other to credit any other value to the recruit in the exchange”). 
 59. See id. at *56 (“This price fixing agreement constitutes a restraint of 
trade.”). As a matter of law, this anticompetitive restraint did not require the 
plaintiffs to make a direct showing of consumer harm because “[t]he Supreme 
Court has indicated that monopsonistic practices that harm suppliers may 
violate antitrust law even if they do not directly harm consumers.” Id. at *63 
(citing Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948)). 
 60. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at *78, O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW, 2014 WL 3899815 (citing Paladin Associates, Inc. v. 
Montana Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)) (explaining that to 
determine whether anticompetitive restraints are justified, the Court “must 
consider whether the ‘anticompetitive aspects of the challenged practice 
outweigh its procompetitive effects’”). 
 61. With respect to the NCAA’s claims that its restraints promoted 
competitive balance, the court found such evidence fully rebutted by the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, concluding that “the NCAA has not presented sufficient 
evidence to show that its restrictions on compensation actually have any effect 
on competitive balance, let alone produce an optimal level of competitive 
balance.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at *83, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 
No. C-09-3329-CW, 2014 WL 3899815. See generally id. at *34–37 (discussing 
the entirety of the court’s finding of facts with respect to the NCAA’s 
competitive balance argument). The court recognized that “[e]ven if the NCAA 
had presented some evidence of a causal connection between its challenged rules 
and its current level of competitive balance, [the NCAA] ha[d] not shown that 
the current level of competitive balance [was] necessary to maintain its current 
level of consumer demand.” Id. at *36. Moreover, the trend of premier college 
sports programs using their additional resources to invest more heavily in 
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other of the NCAA’s affirmative defenses fared somewhat 
better.62 
With regard to the NCAA’s first affirmative defense—that its 
restraints on college-athlete pay were procompetitive because 
they “promote[d] consumer demand for its product by preserving 
its tradition of amateurism in college sports”—the court held that 
“the NCAA’s restrictions on student-athlete compensation play a 
limited role in driving FBS football and Division I basketball-
related products.”63 Thus, while “these restraints might justify a 
restriction on large payments to student-athletes while in school, 
they do not justify the rigid prohibition on compensating student-
athletes—in the present or the future—with any share of 
licensing revenue generated from the use of their names, images 
and likenesses.”64 Of particular note, the court found that the 
                                                                                                     
“recruiting efforts, athletic facilities, dorms, coaching, and other amenities 
designed to attract the top student-athletes . . . negated whatever equalizing 
effect the NCAA’s restraints on student-athlete compensation might have once 
had on competitive balance.” Id. at *85. As for the NCAA’s claims that its 
restraints enabled it to increase the number of schools and student-athletes that 
participate in FBS football and Division I basketball, the court found that “the 
restrictions on student-athlete compensation do nothing to increase this output.” 
Id. at *40. To the contrary, the court found the evidence to show that “because 
participation in FBS football and Division I basketball typically raises a school’s 
profile and leads to increased athletic-based revenue, the number of schools 
participating in FBS football and Division I basketball has increased steadily 
throughout time, and likely will continue to rise.” Id. at *40. Moreover, “the 
NCAA’s assertion that schools will leave FBS and Division I for financial 
reasons if the challenged restraints were removed was not credible.” Id. at *41–
42. 
 62. See id. at *37–43 (recognizing, in part, the benefits of integrating 
student-athletes into college communities and increasing the number of games 
played). 
 63. Id. at *24, *82. 
 64. Id. at *82–83. As a matter of law, the court rejected the NCAA’s 
argument that the Supreme Court holding in Board of Regents v. NCAA stood 
for the sweeping proposition that student-athletes must be barred during their 
college years and forever thereafter from receiving any money for NCAA 
members’ use of their names, likeness, and identities, holding to the contrary 
that certain incidental language in Board of Regents “does not establish that the 
NCAA’s current restraints on compensation are procompetitive and without less 
restrictive alternatives.” Id. at *79, *80. Upon review of the factual evidence 
related to the purported link between the NCAA’s no-pay rules and preserving 
fan interest via amateurism, the court found that “the historical evidence 
presented demonstrates that the association’s amateurism rules have not been 
nearly as consistent as the NCAA has proclaimed.” Id. at *24, *27 (indicating 
further that in the early days of college sports the NCAA’s amateurism rules did 
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NCAA failed to present any evidence whatsoever that payment to 
college athletes of less than $20,000 per year, or payment to 
college athletes via a trust, would harm consumer demand to 
view college sports.65 
Meanwhile, as for the NCAA’s proposed justification that its 
restraints on athlete pay help to “promote the integration of 
academics and athletics,” the court found the evidence presented 
by the NCAA to somewhat validate this argument.66 Recognizing 
a legal principle that improving product quality may be a 
legitimate procompetitive justification, the court acknowledged 
that the pay restraints could be procompetitive if they helped to 
reduce the great disparity in wealth among college students, and 
that this result helped “to integrate student-athletes into the 
academic communities of their schools.”67 Nevertheless, the court 
still concluded that the only way in which the challenged rules 
might facilitate the integration of academics and athletics is by 
preventing student-athletes from being cut off from the broader 
campus community,” and that “[a]s with the NCAA’s amateurism 
justification . . . the NCAA may not use this goal to justify its 
sweeping prohibition on any student-athlete compensation, paid 
now or in the future . . . .”68 Thus, the court concluded that 
limited restrictions on student-athlete compensation may help 
schools to achieve this narrow procompetitive goal.69 
                                                                                                     
not even address the importance of athlete education, which “the NCAA now 
considers the primary motivation for participating in intercollegiate athletics”). 
 65. See id. at *28–30 (considering the flaws of and rejecting a survey 
indicating that viewers would be less likely to watch college football if athletes 
were paid); id. at *82 (noting that the NCAA’s expert witness “did not ask 
respondents for their opinions about providing student-athletes with a share of 
the licensing revenues generated from the use of their own names, images, and 
likenesses,” among other flaws in his surveying methodologies). 
 66. See id. at *37–40 (weighing the evidence supporting and rejecting the 
claim that restrictions on compensation help student-athletes integrate into 
college communities). 
 67. Id. at *39, *86. 
 68. Id. at *86–88. 
 69. See id. at *87 (noting the benefits of limited restrictions). 
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3. Allegedly Less Restrictive Alternatives 
Upon finding the NCAA to have shown very limited 
procompetitive effects to its wage restraints on college athletes, 
the court finally turned to the issue of whether these 
procompetitive benefits could be achieved in a less restrictive 
manner.70 Here, the plaintiffs proposed three less restrictive 
alternatives to the NCAA’s blanket prohibition on student-athlete 
pay: (1) raising the permissible grant-in-aid limit that schools 
may award to their athletes in stipends; (2) allowing NCAA 
member schools to hold in trust for their athletes a limited and 
equal share of licensing revenues; and (3) permitting student-
athletes to receive compensation from third-party 
endorsements.71 
With respect to the first proposal—raising the permissible 
grant-in-aid limit that schools may award to their athletes in 
stipends—the court found the alternative would limit the 
anticompetitive effects without harming NCAA interests because 
“[a] stipend capped at the cost of attendance would not violate the 
NCAA’s own definition of amateurism [as] it would only cover 
educational expenses.”72 Noting that “the NCAA member schools 
used to provide student-athletes with similar stipends before the 
NCAA lowered its cap on grant-in-aid,” the court further found 
that “none of the evidence presented at trial suggests that 
consumer demand for the NCAA’s product would decrease if 
schools were to provide such stipends to student-athletes once 
again.”73 To the contrary, the court found that “[i]f anything, 
providing student-athletes with such stipends would [better meet 
the NCAA’s stated goals of integrating student-athletes into 
general academic life] by removing some of the educational 
expenses that they would otherwise have to bear, such as school 
supplies, which are not covered by a full grant-in-aid.”74  
                                                                                                     
 70. See id. at *89–94 (noting the court’s analysis of benefits in a less 
restrictive manner). 
 71. See id. at *43–48 (describing the plaintiff’s alternatives). 
 72. Id. at *44. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at *44–45. 
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Regarding the second alternative—allowing schools to hold 
limited payments in trust for student-athletes—the court 
similarly found this to enable the NCAA to achieve its stated 
goals in a less restrictive manner, as long as the compensation 
was limited and distributed equally among team members.75 In 
addition, the court found the evidence failed to show that 
allowing payments of this nature would hurt consumer demand 
for college sports, as long as these payments were limited in 
amount, equal for all players based on the use of their names, 
images, and likenesses, and not actually paid to the athletes until 
after they left school.76 Finally, the court found that “holding 
compensation in trust for student-athletes while they are enrolled 
would not erect any new barriers to schools’ efforts to educate 
student-athletes or integrate them into their schools’ academic 
communities.”77 
Nevertheless, with respect to the third alternative—
permitting student-athletes to receive compensation from third-
party endorsements—the court found this outcome did not offer a 
less restrictive way for the NCAA to achieve its stated goals.78 To 
the contrary, the court concluded that “[a]llowing student-
athletes to endorse commercial products would undermine the 
efforts of both the NCAA and its member schools to protect 
against the ‘commercial exploitation’ of student athletes” even 
though much evidence at trial indicated that the NCAA itself 
does not always act in a manner to protect such exploitation.79 
The findings of fact further noted that “[p]laintiffs themselves 
previously indicated that they were not seeking to enjoin the 
NCAA from enforcing its current rules prohibiting such 
endorsements”—thus indicating this restraint may have been 
                                                                                                     
 75. Id. at *45. 
 76. Id. at *45–46. 
 77. Id. at *46. 
 78. Id. at *47. 
 79. See id. at *47–48 (“Although the trial record contains evidence—and 
Dr. Emmert himself acknowledged—that the NCAA has not always succeeded 
in protecting student-athletes from commercial exploitation, this failure does 
not justify expanding opportunities for commercial exploitation of student-
athletes in the future.”). 
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viewed differently by the court if the plaintiffs had proposed this 
remedy from the very beginning.80 
B. Permanent Injunction 
Based upon the court’s legal findings, the court entered an 
injunction to remove what it deemed to be the “unreasonable 
elements” of the NCAA’s restraints, as were found in the case.81 
First, the court issued a permanent injunction, enjoining the 
NCAA from enforcing any rules that “would prohibit its member 
schools and conferences from offering their FBS football and 
Division I [men’s] basketball recruits a limited share of the 
revenues generated from the use of their names, images, and 
likenesses, in addition to a full grant in aid.”82 The injunction, 
however, still allowed the NCAA to cap the amount of pay 
immediately available to student-athletes at the full cost of 
attending college.83 
In addition, the court enjoined the NCAA from “enforcing any 
rules to prevent its member schools and conferences from offering 
to deposit a limited share of licensing revenue in trust for their 
FBS football and Division I basketball recruits, payable when 
they leave school or their eligibility expires.”84 This part of the 
injunction, however, was again limited to allow the NCAA to cap 
the amount of money that may be held in trust annually for each 
player at $5,000 (in 2014 dollars).85 The injunction also allows the 
NCAA to enact and enforce a rule that ensures no school may 
offer any recruit a greater share of the licensing revenue than 
any other recruit in the same class, on the same team.86 
                                                                                                     
 80. Id. at *47. 
 81. Id. at *96. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at *96–97 (“[The injunction] will prohibit the NCAA from setting 
a cap of less than five thousand dollars (in 2014 dollars) [on the amount of 
money to be held in trust] for every year that the student-athlete remains 
academically eligible to compete.”). 
 86. Id. at *97. 
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Although the court is not entirely transparent about the 
basis for this $5,000-per-year cap on athlete compensation, one 
could surmise this amount is based in part on the NCAA expert 
study about consumer reaction to paying college athletes, which 
failed to test for consumer opposition to paying athletes less than 
$20,000.87 It also seems based in part on testimony by NCAA 
expert witness Neal Pilson that “he would not be troubled if 
schools were allowed to make five thousand dollar payments to 
their student-athletes . . . if the payments were held in trust.”88 
IV. Why the District Court Was Correct to Find the NCAA’s 
Restraints on Revenue Sharing to Violate Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act 
Overall, the court’s decision in O’Bannon was a legally 
sound win for the plaintiffs.89 The gravamen of the district court’s 
ruling—that NCAA restraints on college-athlete pay violate 
antitrust law—was omniscient in both its reasoning and its 
outcome.90 While the decision was among the first to hold that the 
NCAA’s “no pay” rules may violate antitrust law, the decision 
indubitably conformed to the well-established antitrust principles 
that have long been accepted by courts in the general sports 
marketplace.91 For example, the decision recognized that an 
                                                                                                     
 87. See id. at *82 (“[The survey suggests that] the public’s attitudes toward 
student-athlete compensation depend heavily on the level of compensation that 
student-athletes would receive. This is consistent with the testimony of [the 
NCAA’s expert witnesses], who both indicated that smaller payments to 
student-athletes would bother them less than larger payments.”). 
 88. Id. at *45. 
 89. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining the proper 
application of the rule of reason analysis); see Michael McCann, What Ed 
O’Bannon’s Victory Over the NCAA Means Moving Forward, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED ONLINE (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-
basketball/2014/08/09/ed-obannon-ncaa-claudia-wilken-appeal-name-image-
likeness-rights (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (describing the O’Bannon ruling as “a 
significant, but carefully limited, legal victory for advocates of student -
athletes”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 90. See infra Part V (explaining the limits of the O’Bannon holding). 
 91. See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (explaining the need to 
evaluate Sherman Act claims on the competitive effects of regulations rather 
than the needs of the industry’s members); see Daniel E. Lazaroff, An Antitrust 
Exemption for the NCAA: Sound Public Policy or Letting the Fox Loose in the 
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agreement among separate entities in the sports industry to 
collectively fix athletes’ wages below the market rate produces a 
substantial anticompetitive effect under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.92 This is a conclusion that has long been axiomatic in sports-
antitrust cases where the defendants have been parties other 
than the NCAA.93 
The O’Bannon decision also helped to reconcile the 
longstanding differences between the antitrust treatment of the 
NCAA’s wage restraints with respect to players and coaches.94 
Importantly, in Law v. NCAA,95 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit held that the NCAA’s attempt to cap assistant 
coaches’ salaries below the free market rate produced substantially 
anticompetitive effects under antitrust law.96 Presuming that the 
Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Law was indeed good law, the same 
conclusion should logically have always extended to wage restraints 
for FBS football players and Division I men’s basketball players, 
                                                                                                     
Henhouse, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 229, 231 (2014) (noting that “[w]ith respect to 
alleged anticompetitive restraints on student-athletes,” courts historically 
“side[d] with the NCAA when its amateurism rules were challenged” even 
though there is perhaps a legal basis to rule in the opposite direction). 
 92. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 50–66, O’Bannon, 2014 
WL 3899815 (comparing the case at hand to a volume of jurisprudence and 
concluding that the plaintiffs “presented sufficient evidence to show an 
analogous anticompetitive effect in a similar labor market”). 
 93. See Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: 
Why the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 61, 76 (2013) (noting that wage fixing by sports leagues with 
market power is typically seen as illegal); Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its 
Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist, 86 OR. L. REV. 
329, 359 (2007) (explaining that the NCAA amateurism rules and limits on 
athlete compensation represent “a quintessential example of a horizontal price 
restraint”); cf. Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1061–62 (D.C. 1995) 
(explaining that because athletic prowess is a unique and highly specialized 
resource, “[i]f team owners join together to suppress the price of athletic services 
through monopsony practices, most athletes will not be able to switch profitably 
to other lines of work,” making the market susceptible to monopsony). 
 94. See infra note 166 and accompanying text (arguing that because 
student-athletes are not paid, the salaries and endorsement opportunities 
offered to coaches are disproportionately high). 
 95. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 96. See id. at 1020 (“Under [the quick look rule of reason], the undisputed 
evidence supports a finding of anticompetitive effect.”). 
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given that both categories “are closely akin in practice to traditional 
workers.”97 
Furthermore, the district court’s ruling in O’Bannon accurately 
interpreted the 1984 Supreme Court decision NCAA v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma98 in light of both its 
underlying context, and the factual realities about the college sports 
marketplace.99 Despite the NCAA’s longstanding contentions to the 
contrary, the Board of Regents decision stands foremost for the 
proposition that collective action by NCAA member schools is 
subject to antitrust scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act.100 
                                                                                                     
 97. See Edelman, supra note 93, at 77 (noting that the average Division I 
college football player devotes on average over forty hours per week to his 
sport—more time than the typical U.S. worker spends practicing his profession). 
See Robert McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-
Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 74 (2006) (“[The] 
characterization—that athletes at NCAA-member schools are student-
athletes—is essential to the NCAA because it obscures the legal reality that 
some of these athletes, in fact, are also employees.”). The McCormicks go on to 
argue that  
[b]y creating and fostering the myth that football and men’s 
basketball players at Division I universities are something other than 
employees, the NCAA and its member institutions obtain the 
astonishing pecuniary gain and related benefits of the athletes’ 
talents, time, and energy—that is, their labor—while severely 
curtailing the costs associated with such labor. 
Id. 
 98. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 99. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 79–80, O’Bannon, 2014 
WL 3899815 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) 
Plaintiffs have also presented ample evidence here to show that the 
college sports industry has changed substantially in the thirty years 
since Board of Regents was decided. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s 
incidental phrase in Board of Regents does not establish that the 
NCAA’s current restraints on compensation are procompetitive and 
without less restrictive alternatives. 
 100. See id. at *79–80 (explaining in detail why even though “the NCAA has 
cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents as support for its 
amateurism justification, its reliance on the case remains unavailing”); see also 
Edelman, supra note 93, at 79 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 108 (1984) (supporting this same conclusion)); Lazaroff, 
supra note 91, at 239 (explaining that without an antitrust exemption, the 
NCAA is rightful to be concerned about antitrust liability in light of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in NCAA v. Board of Regents); Note, Sherman Act 
Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1301 
(1992) [hereinafter Sherman Act Note] (footnote omitted) (“Most significantly, 
the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma 
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It does not stand for the proposition that certain NCAA restraints 
are per se legal.101 
Finally, the district court in O’Bannon also did not fall victim 
to any of the errors that had plagued past courts when reviewing 
the wage restraints the NCAA imposed against its athletes.102 
Many past decisions had mistakenly applied a bifurcated test to 
determine whether NCAA rules were subject to antitrust law—
placing “business rules” within the scope of antitrust scrutiny and 
“eligibility rules” (such as those related to amateurism) on the 
                                                                                                     
held that NCAA actions are subject to antitrust scrutiny and should be analyzed 
under the ‘rule of reason’ . . . .”). 
 101. See Marc Edelman, The NCAA’s Death Penalty Sanction—Reasonable 
Self-Governance or an Illegal Group Boycott in Disguise, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 385, 413 (2014) (footnote omitted)  
[I]t is an absurdity of construction to presume that the Supreme 
Court’s statement that ‘most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA 
are justifiable means of fostering competition’ is equivalent to a 
finding that the NCAA conduct cannot yield an anticompetitive 
effect—especially in light of the fact the Supreme Court in Board of 
Regents ultimately found the NCAA’s broadcasting rules to be illegal; 
Sherman Act Note, supra note 100, at 1301 (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court’s 
decision in Board of Regents confirms that the amateurism bylaws are subject to 
antitrust scrutiny”). As further explained in my law review article The NCAA’s 
Death Penalty Sanction—Reasonable Self-Governance or an Illegal Group 
Boycott in Disguise: 
A closer inspection of the Board of Regents decision indicates that the 
language cited by [cases that have found amateurism as a defense, in 
itself, of anticompetitive conduct] does not truly mean what . . . these 
courts purport it to mean. A closer inspection of the Board of Regents 
decision indicates that the language cited by these cases came from a 
section of the decision that explained why NCAA conduct should be 
reviewed under the Rule of Reason rather than the per se test. In 
addition, the language cited specifically states that NCAA 
amateurism rules ‘can be used as procompetitive and not that they 
‘must’ be viewed in such a light. By using the word ‘can’ rather than 
‘must’ and using it in context of determining the proper Competitive 
Effects Test for reviewing NCAA conduct, it is clear that the Supreme 
Court in Board of Regents never actually reached any legal conclusion 
in favor of specially preserving NCAA amateurism. All it did was note 
the argument could have been broached by the NCAA as a defense 
under the Rule of Reason. 
 102. See infra, notes 103–108 and accompanying text (identifying the 
importance of weighing the competitive effects of regulation rather than the 
benefits or disadvantages of enjoining the industry’s members from enacting 
them).  
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outside of scrutiny.103 The court in O’Bannon, however, properly 
recognized that even the NCAA’s amateurism rules were subject 
to antitrust law because, as a matter of economic reality, these 
rules substantially impact commerce.104 Furthermore, whereas 
other past courts had allowed the NCAA to defend its otherwise 
anticompetitive restraints based on the mere claims of 
“preserving amateurism”105 and providing “an opportunity for 
competition among amateur students pursuing a collegiate 
education,”106 the court in O’Bannon disagreed, holding that 
“[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that antitrust defendants 
cannot rely on . . . social welfare benefits to justify 
anticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Act.”107 Thus, the 
                                                                                                     
 103. See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that 
“many district courts have held that the Sherman Act does not apply to the 
NCAA’s promulgation and enforcement of eligibility requirements”), vacated, 
NCAA v. Smith, 529 U.S. 459 (1999); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 497 
(D.N.J. 1998) (noting that certain NCAA bylaws related to athlete eligibility 
were non-commercial); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743 (M.D. Tenn. 
1990) (presuming a legal difference in treatment under antitrust law “between 
the NCAA’s efforts to restrict the televising of college football games and the 
NCAA’s efforts to maintain a discernible line between amateurism and 
professionalism”). 
 104. See Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motion to Dismiss, O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, Nos. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) 
(finding that the plaintiffs in O’Bannon had met their burden with respect to 
pleading an impact on interstate commerce); see also Edelman, supra note 93, at 
63, 88–89 (noting that NCAA oversees a nearly $11 billion college sports 
industry with colleges producing yearly revenues upwards of $100 million; 
television rights for events like NCAA men’s basketball tournaments make 
upwards of $750 million yearly; and NCAA schools receive millions of dollars 
from stadium and players’ equipment advertising rights); Gabe Feldman, A 
Modest Proposal for Taming the Antitrust Beast, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 249, 254–55 
(2014) (explaining that the “‘myth of amateurism’ [improperly] ignores the fact 
that the NCAA has become a profit-seeking enterprise that governs multi-billion 
dollar entertainment products”); J.G. Joakim Soederbaum, Comment, Leveling 
the Playing Field—Balancing Student-Athletes’ Short- and Long-Term Financial 
Interests with Educational Institutions’ Interests in Avoiding NCAA Sanctions, 
24 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 261, 277 (2013) (noting that NCAA members schools, 
despite their claims of amateurism and non-commercialism, willingly “partake 
in the lucrative athletic endorsement field”). 
 105. Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 382 (D. Ariz. 1983). 
 106. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 107. Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment; Granting 
Motion to Amend Class Definition; Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for 
Reconsideration, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig., No. C-09-1967-CW, 2014 WL 1410451, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014) 
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O’Bannon decision properly acknowledged that under the modern 
view of antitrust law, “even a positive, noneconomic motive can 
no longer save an otherwise [anticompetitive] restraint.”108 
V. Why the District Court’s Permanent Injunction in O’Bannon 
Was Insufficient, and Does Not Fully Ameliorate the NCAA’s 
Restraints 
While the district court’s reasoning in O’Bannon was both 
legally sound and societally groundbreaking, the permanent 
injunction implemented by the court was nevertheless limited 
and weak, as it failed to ameliorate the NCAA’s anticompetitive 
practices as effectively as possible.109 Indeed, the only alleged 
procompetitive benefits to which the court ascribed any merit 
related to links between the NCAA’s ‘no pay’ rules and both the 
popularity of college sports and the quality of students’ 
educations.110 Nevertheless, the court’s injunction in O’Bannon 
seemed to allow NCAA practices that did not clearly and 
substantially benefit either of these areas.111 
Perhaps it would have made more sense for the court to have 
simply enjoined the NCAA’s restraints outright, without crafting 
a complex system of restraints on college-athlete pay that the 
court deemed less restrictive.112 Although antitrust law’s Rule of 
                                                                                                     
(citing FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990)). 
 108. Edelman, supra note 93, at 92; see also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (noting that any proper rule of reason 
analysis must turn on the competitive effects of the restraint and not on 
whether the restraint is “in the interest of the members of [the] industry”).   
 109. See infra notes 110–11 (explaining the practices which are permitted by 
the injunction but offer dubious procompetitive effects). See generally McCann, 
supra note 89 (noting that the court’s injunction allowing for payment of college 
athletes up to $5,000 per year “is not quite the all-encompassing change that 
some NCAA critics sought”). 
 110. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 78–89, O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, No. C-09-3329 CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (discussing procompetitive 
justifications). 
 111. Cf. Sherman Act Note, supra note 100, at 1312 (finding that limits on 
college-athlete pay are “not tailored to the goal of promoting intercollegiate 
athletics because many NCAA institutions frequently violate the rule,” and 
“[t]he public knows these violations occur, but the product of college sports in 
the economic marketplace continues to increase in popularity”). 
 112. See infra notes 113–19 and accompanying text (offering less limited 
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Reason has been described as “[o]ne of the most amorphous rules 
in antitrust,”113 the court in O’Bannon did not necessarily have to 
adopt one of the less restrictive alternatives suggested by the 
plaintiffs.114 Rather, the court could have simply recognized that 
under a “balancing test” the NCAA’s longstanding restraints on 
college-athlete pay far exceeded any alleged procompetitive 
justifications, and thus the court could have entirely enjoined the 
NCAA’s ‘no pay’ restraints.115 If the court in O’Bannon had 
simply overturned the NCAA’s ‘no pay’ rules, anarchy would not 
have ensued throughout college sports as the NCAA 
incredulously suggests.116 Rather, the result would have been the 
benign devolving of power from the NCAA overall to the various 
individual athletic conferences.117 Such a result would have 
                                                                                                     
alternatives to the court’s injunction and arguing their potential efficacy). 
 113. Carrier, supra note 35, at 827; see Peter C. Carstensen & Paul 
Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes and the NCAA: Limiting the Scope 
and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 545, 571 (1995) 
(describing antitrust law’s Rule of Reason as “very ambiguous in practice”). See 
generally Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 237 (explaining that “[t]he rule-of-reason 
journey is an arduous one, and it can generate considerable expense and 
substantial investment of time and money”). 
 114. See Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative 
Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009) (noting 
that the Supreme Court has never adopted a less restrictive alternatives inquiry 
as part of the Rule of Reason, and even the circuits that have adopted this 
inquiry have generally not required it where a restraint does not have 
meaningful procompetitive benefits and is thus otherwise already illegal); see 
also Carrier, supra note 35, at 831 (noting that where an anticompetitive 
restraint does not have any procompetitive benefits, the restraint is deemed 
illegal without the need to assess the availability of less restrictive alternatives). 
 115. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 243 (2d Cir. 
2003) (upholding district court’s ruling enjoining a restraint under antitrust 
law’s Rule of Reason based on bench trial findings that rule had an 
anticompetitive effect in a relevant market, and that the defendants “failed to 
show that the anticompetitive effects of their exclusionary rules are outweighed 
by procompetitive benefits”); see also Carrier, supra note 35, at 831 (describing 
the ruling in United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. as the “sole plaintiff victory” in 
five reviewed instances during which the court applied true balancing). 
 116. See infra notes 117–19 and accompanying text (explaining why anarchy 
would not ensue if a balancing test were used); see also Edelman, supra note 13, 
at 1021 n.3 (providing a series of quotes from NCAA leaders arguing that 
overturning the NCAA’s amateurism restraints would lead to anarchy). 
 117. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 13, at 1046 (discussing this option of 
devolving power to the conference); Edelman, supra note 93, at 97 (“[R]ules 
governing student-athlete pay at the conference level . . . would likely be far less 
restrictive to student-athletes, colleges, and consumers because individual 
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allowed “each individual conference to choose a common wage 
regime . . . without the need for an overarching super-cartel to 
control the entire market for college-age athletes.”118 It would 
have continued to prevent an entirely free market for college- 
athlete services, but would have still importantly allowed for 
inter-conference competition determined by the free market 
under traditional principles of supply and demand.119 
Alternatively, if the court did not enjoin the NCAA’s 
restraints outright, the court still, at a minimum, should have 
implemented the third less restrictive alternative discussed in 
the court’s opinion—allowing for college athletes to seek third-
party compensation for the sale of their likenesses.120 Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers may have hurt their prospects of obtaining this 
injunction by initially stating that they were not seeking a free 
market for athlete endorsements, and by initially indicating that 
their claim was only about creating a free market to sell their 
names and likenesses to the NCAA.121 Nevertheless, an 
injunction of this nature would have benefited the most elite 
college athletes by providing them with the opportunity to obtain 
financial security. In turn, this may have helped to integrate 
these athletes into their academic communities by incentivizing 
                                                                                                     
conferences lack sufficient ‘market power’ within any relevant market to 
illegally restrain trade. Thus, each individual sports conference represents just 
a small share of the college . . . sports marketplace.”). 
 118. Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz, “Amateurism” in Big-Time 
College Sports, 14 ANTITRUST 51, 54 (2000). 
 119. See Edelman, supra note 93, at 97  
“[C]onference-wide salary caps on student-athlete pay are unlikely to 
lead to a . . . ban of student-athlete compensation. [S]ome conferences 
would likely opt to allow student-athletes to receive money as a 
means to compete . . . for student-athlete labor . . . . [Others may] 
recogniz[e] that taking the moral high ground may 
make . . . consumers more interested in [making] purchas[es] . . . .” 
 120. See infra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (discussing pros and 
cons of allowing athletes to seek third-party compensation for sale of 
likenesses). 
 121. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 47, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 
No. C-09-3329 CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (stating, in terms of evaluating the 
proposed less restrictive alternative of allowing college athletes to receive money 
for endorsement deals, that “[p]laintiffs themselves previously indicated that 
they were not seeking to enjoin the NCAA from enforcing its current rules 
prohibiting such endorsements”). 
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them to stay in college for a full four years and work toward 
earning their diplomas alongside their classmates.122 
The argument that college athletes would be more likely to 
stay in school for four years and earn their degrees if they were 
allowed to engage in third party sponsorship deals is not a novel 
one.123 It has long been established that the Division I college 
football and men’s basketball players who are most likely to leave 
school early to enter the professional ranks are those from low-
income families.124 Allowing these athletes to receive the full cost 
of attendance is a step in the right direction; however, the sort of 
money enabled by the O’Bannon injunction pales in comparison 
to the amount that would have been available through third-
party sponsorship opportunities.125 While a $5,000 per year 
stipend may provide a college athlete ample money for food, 
shelter and perhaps even the occasional movie, this sum is almost 
certainly not enough to shift an elite college athlete’s priorities 
away from imminently turning professional.126 
                                                                                                     
 122. See Marc Edelman, Note, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in 
Men’s College Basketball, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 861, 863 (2002) (“By 
colluding to restrain the financial opportunities of student-athletes, Amateurism 
influences star college basketball players to leave school without graduating in 
favor of professional leagues.”).  
 123. See, e.g., id. at 875 (“College basketball players, not sharing in the 
revenue generated by their talents, are increasingly forgoing college in favor of 
the NBA.”); cf. Michael A. Corgan, Comment, Permitting Student-Athletes to 
Accept Endorsement Deals: A Solution to the Financial Corruption of College 
Athletics Created by Unethical Sports Agents and the NCAA’s Revenue-
Generating Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 415 (2012) (discussing how 
allowing college athletes access to a free market for endorsements is likely to 
meet their financial needs).   
 124. See Kenneth Shropshire, Compensation and the African American 
Student-Athlete, in RACISM IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS, 272–73 (2000) (noting that 
when considering the low graduation rates of African-American athletes in 
Division I men’s basketball and FBS football, the reality of race as a near proxy 
for familiar wealth needs to be considered). 
 125. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 122, at 876 (noting that even more than 
fifteen years ago, basketball star Tracy McGrady was able to sign a six-year, $12 
million endorsement deal immediately out of high school, before even playing in 
a professional game). 
 126. See id. at 885–86 (discussing a deregulation model as a solution); 
Michael Corgan, supra note 123, at 415 (concluding that “[p]roviding student-
athletes with thirty to fifty dollars per month (or $360 to $600 a year) would not 
lessen the desire for poor student-athletes to accept thousands of dollars from 
sports agents,” but “[a]llowing student-athletes to seek lucrative endorsement 
deals . . . [would provide] an ample amount of money”). 
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Furthermore, allowing college athletes to sponsor products or 
sell their publicity rights brings the treatment of college athletes 
in line with non-athletes on college campuses, whose private 
ventures are not regulated.127 To the extent that procompetitive 
benefits truly emanate from college athletes engaging with the 
mainstream academic community, allowing college athletes to 
engage in the same unregulated lifestyle as traditional students 
represents an important step in the right direction.128 In addition, 
allowing elite college athletes to license the rights to their 
likenesses to third parties enables these athletes to obtain 
business and negotiation experience that may be directly relevant 
to their course work—should they pursue studies in strategic 
management, marketing, or sports management. 
VI. Implications of the O’Bannon Decision and Logical Next Steps 
Some advocates for college-athlete rights have expressed 
disappointment over the outcome in O’Bannon v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association—believing that the court’s 
injunction did not go far enough to protect the interests of college 
athletes. Nevertheless, the U.S. District Court’s decision in 
O’Bannon is unlikely to serve as the last word in the dispute over 
college-athlete compensation.129 The stark contrast between the 
court’s holding and the limited nature of its injunction may lead 
                                                                                                     
 127. See Jon Solomon, Can Congress (Yes, Congress) Help NCAA Find 
Solutions?, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/college 
football/writer/jon-solomon/24666147/can-congress-yes-congress-help-ncaa-find-
solutions (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (noting that Jo Potuto believes “the NCAA 
should have no rule banning players from using their name and likeness to be 
paid,” likening such pay “to actress Emma Watson being paid for appearing in 
movies while a student at Brown and still participating in theater performances 
at the university”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See 
Edelman, supra note 122, at 884 (explaining why stipends “fail to provide young 
basketball players enough money to keep them from leaving the NCAA for the 
NBA”). 
 128. See supra notes 105–23 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits 
of allowing college athletes the same unregulated lifestyle as classmates). 
 129. See infra notes 130–95 and accompanying text (discussing both parties’ 
grounds for appeal in O’Bannon, subject matter for subsequent lawsuits against 
the NCAA, impact of O’Bannon on unionizing and Title IX compliance, and 
potential for a statutory antitrust exemption). 
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to an appeal of the decision by both parties.130 Meanwhile, the 
decision also may lead to various new class action lawsuits 
involving NCAA amateurism rules, as well as strategic changes 
to the college-athlete unionization efforts, new concerns about 
Title IX compliance, and even an attempt by NCAA leaders to 
secure from Congress a statutory exemption from U.S. antitrust 
law.131 
A. Grounds for an NCAA Appeal 
Within days of the district court’s ruling in O’Bannon, the 
NCAA already had indicated plans to appeal the court’s 
decision.132 The anticipated NCAA appeal may argue that, as a 
matter of law, the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents 
precludes any antitrust challenges related to NCAA eligibility 
rules, including challenges related to college athlete ‘no pay’ 
rules.133 To support this argument, the NCAA may rely upon 
three appellate decisions from other circuits that interpret Board 
of Regents in a manner more favorable to the NCAA’s position.134 
                                                                                                     
 130. See infra notes 132–54 and accompanying text (discussing the grounds 
for appeal for each O’Bannon party). 
 131. See infra notes 155–95 and accompanying text (discussing subject 
matter for subsequent lawsuits against the NCAA, impact of O’Bannon on 
unionizing and Title IX compliance, and potential for a statutory antitrust 
exemption). 
 132. See, e.g., Steve Berkowitz & Thomas O’Toole, NCAA Seeks Clarification 
Prior to Appeal of O’Bannon Case, USA TODAY (Aug. 11, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/08/10/ed-obannon-ncaa-
appeal-court-ruling-images-likenesses/13860823 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) 
(indicating the NCAA’s intent to appeal the district court’s ruling in O’Bannon) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Michael Marot, Emmert 
Says NCAA Will Appeal O’Bannon Ruling, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 10, 2014), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/emmert-says-ncaa-will-appeal-obannon-ruling-1 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (quoting NCAA president Mark Emmert that “[n]o 
one on our legal team or the college conferences’ legal teams think this is a 
violation of antitrust laws and we need to get that settled in the courts,” and 
Donald Remy, stating he would take the case to the Supreme Court) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 133. See infra notes 134–40 and accompanying text (discussing appellate 
decisions the NCAA may use to support its argument). 
 134. See infra notes 135–40 and accompanying text (listing the three 
appellate decisions). 
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First, in Smith v. NCAA,135 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit held that “the Sherman Act does not apply to the 
NCAA’s promulgation and enforcement of eligibility 
requirements” because these requirements are not commercial in 
nature.136 In McCormack v. NCAA,137 the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that rules that determine who is eligible 
to compete in college football games “enhance public interest in 
intercollegiate athletics” and are consequently procompetitive.138 
Meanwhile, in Banks v. NCAA,139 the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit held that NCAA rules about player eligibility 
are procompetitive because “the NCAA does not exist as a minor 
league training ground for future NFL players but rather to 
provide an opportunity for competition among amateur students 
pursuing a collegiate education.”140 
None of these three decisions, however, is binding on the 
courts in the Ninth Circuit. In addition, each of these three 
decisions is suspect in its legal reasoning.141 Although the court in 
Smith concluded that the NCAA’s amateurism rules were not 
“interstate commerce,” the Supreme Court’s ruling in Board of 
Regents recognized the exact opposite—that NCAA rules meet the 
“interstate commerce” requirement and are thus subject to review 
                                                                                                     
 135. 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 136. Id. at 185. 
 137. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 138. Id. at 1344 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 117 (1984)). The court in McCormack further cited directly to Board of 
Regents for the proposition that “[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the 
regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering 
competition . . . .” Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 102 (1984)). 
 139. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 140. Id. at 1089–90 (preserving an NCAA rule that disallows college athletes 
who had previously entered a professional sports league’s draft in that same 
sport). 
 141. See infra notes 142–52 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws in 
the legal reasoning of each decision). See Lazaroff, supra note 93, at 340 (noting 
that since the Supreme Court decision in Board of Regents “lower federal courts 
[in some circuits have] seized the opportunity to treat NCAA player restraints in 
a significantly different manner” and have adopted “a more deferential 
approach” to the NCAA than is seen otherwise in sports antitrust 
jurisprudence). 
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on their competitive merits.142 Furthermore, as a factual matter, 
“intercollegiate athletics in its management is clearly business, 
and big business at that.”143 Currently, the NCAA represents an 
$11 billion industry with numerous colleges producing revenues 
upwards of $100 million per year.144 Even some NCAA member 
schools nowadays produce annual revenues upwards of $100 
million from their athletics programs.145 
Similarly, the court’s reasoning in McCormack was likely 
flawed because it “gerrymandered the language in Board of 
Regents to rule in favor of the NCAA.”146 The language quoted in 
McCormack in favor of finding the NCAA’s eligibility rules 
procompetitive specifically “came from a section of Board of 
Regents that explained why NCAA conduct should be reviewed 
                                                                                                     
 142. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984); 
see Edelman, supra note 93, at 88 (explaining that under the principles of the 
Supreme Court decision in McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., 
444 U.S. 232 (1980), “the only thing a plaintiff must demonstrate to meet the 
threshold issue of ‘interstate commerce’ is a ‘substantial effect on interstate 
commerce generated by [a defendant’s general business activities]’”); see also 
Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 113, at 567–68 (“The conclusion is 
inescapable that the NCAA is a private organization engaged in the restraint of 
economic competition in intercollegiate athletics programs, and so is necessarily 
within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.”). 
 143. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977); see Lazaroff, 
supra note 93, at 352 (concluding that “the line of demarcation between 
professional and intercollegiate athletics is not as clear as some would have it, 
and NCAA regulations directed at student-athletes should be properly 
characterized as more commercial in nature than earlier case law suggests”).  
 144. See Edelman, supra note 93, at 63 (noting that “some NCAA members 
have become increasingly wealthy—grossing annual revenues upwards of $100 
million per year” and that “in 2010, a twelve-team athletic conference collected 
more than $1 billion in athletic receipts”); see also Where Does the Money Go?, 
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Answers/Nine+ 
points+to+consider_one (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (accessed by entering the 
URL in the Internet Archive index) (“[The] annual revenue for college athletics 
programs was estimated for 2008–09 at about $10.6 billion.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 145. Edelman, supra note 93, at 63; see also NCAA Finances, USA TODAY, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/schools/finances (last visited Nov. 18, 
2014) (listing thirteen NCAA member colleges with annual revenues exceeding 
$100 million, topped by the University of Texas with $165.7 million in annual 
revenues) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 146. Edelman, supra note 93, at 94 (citing McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 
1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
DISTRICT COURT DECISION IN O’BANNON 2351 
under the full rule of reason rather than the per se test.”147 
Furthermore, the exact language cited in McCormack, as quoted 
from Board of Regents, actually states that the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules . . . ‘can’ be viewed as procompetitive.”148 “By 
using the word ‘can’ rather than ‘must,’” the Supreme Court was 
not declaring that all NCAA amateurism rules were 
procompetitive as a matter of law.149 Rather, the Court was 
simply leaving open the possibility that, upon a full factual 
inquiry, many of the NCAA’s amateurism restraints might 
ultimately be found procompetitive. 
Lastly, the court in Banks misconstrued the language from 
Board of Regents in the same manner as McCormack—error that 
was pointed out by the Honorable Joel Flaum in his robust 
dissent to that case.150 Even Supreme Court Justice Harry 
Blackmun seemed to agree with the dissent’s view in Banks.151 In 
a bench memorandum that assessed whether to grant certiorari, 
Justice Blackmun wrote by hand “CA7 got this one dead 
wrong.”152 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court never granted 
certiorari in the case. 
B. Grounds for a Plaintiffs’ Appeal 
The plaintiffs in O’Bannon also may attempt to appeal based 
on the decision’s limited practical benefits to elite college 
athletes.153 It is odd to think that, as a matter of law, an 
agreement among NCAA members to pay their athletes $0 for the 
rights to use their likenesses would constitute illegal wage fixing, 
but an agreement to cap athlete payments for these rights at 
                                                                                                     
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
102 (1984)). 
 150. See Banks v. NCAA. 977 F.2d 1081, 1098–99 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J., 
dissenting) (stating the steps that Banks would have to take under Board of 
Regents and other case law to prove his claim). 
 151. See infra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing Justice 
Blackmun’s reaction to the Banks outcome). 
 152. Edelman, supra note 93, at 95 (citations omitted). 
 153. See id. at 76 (suggesting alternatives to the no-pay rule). 
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$5,000 per year could potentially still be deemed 
procompetitive.154  
Nevertheless, the iconoclastic nature of the court’s ruling in 
O’Bannon seems to arise from the plaintiffs’ own failure to 
introduce evidence showing that payments to college athletes 
exceeding $5,000 per year would benefit consumers in any 
relevant market. Furthermore, Judge Wilken’s decision leaves 
open the possibility that future litigation will lead to a far 
broader injunction against NCAA pay restraints. This would 
happen if future plaintiffs can introduce better evidence showing 
that restraints on college-athlete pay harm consumers by denying 
them the ability to monetarily voice their preferences for 
particular college football and basketball recruits signing with 
colleges in their home markets.  
Should the plaintiffs in O’Bannon choose to appeal the 
decision, they will likely face an uphill battle of challenging the 
district court’s ruling in light of their failure to produce evidence 
that lifting the restraints on college-athlete pay beyond $5,000 
per year would benefit consumers overall. Had the plaintiffs 
produced even a single expert report showing that fan interest in 
college sports would have remained stable in a truly free market 
for college athletes’ services, the plaintiffs would have been in a 
far better position to appeal the district court’s ruling as a matter 
of law. 
C. Subject Matter for Subsequent Lawsuits Against the NCAA 
As referenced in the previous section, the district court’s 
decision in O’Bannon may further impact a number of other 
lawsuits currently under review by the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California, as well as encourage the filing of 
new lawsuits against the NCAA based on slightly different 
antitrust theories.155 One notable antitrust lawsuit currently 
                                                                                                     
 154. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 
(1940) (“Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may 
be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their 
reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential threat 
to the central nervous system of the economy.”). 
 155. See infra notes 156–67 and accompanying text (discussing a current 
lawsuit and the potential of future lawsuits). 
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under review by the same district court is Jenkins v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association.156 This lawsuit seeks to overturn 
NCAA rules “placing a ceiling on the compensation that may be 
paid to [college] athletes for their services.”157 It specifically 
alleges that colleges competing in FBS football and Division I 
basketball contests have illegally conspired to deny their athletes 
the ability to sell their athletic services to colleges in a free 
market.158 
Although some legal commentators have opined that the 
Jenkins lawsuit is “doomed for failure” based on the district 
court’s limited remedy in O’Bannon,159 such a conclusion is overly 
simplified if not downright inaccurate. To the contrary, the legal 
holding in O’Bannon explicates that the NCAA’s restraints on 
college-athlete pay have strong anticompetitive effects,160 albeit 
also perhaps some procompetitive benefits.161 Because the 
restraints on college-athlete compensation exceeding $5,000 per 
year remain unsettled by the O’Bannon decision, the Jenkins 
lawsuit gives a new class of antitrust plaintiffs the chance to 
demonstrate that the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s 
restraints—even with respect to payments exceeding $5,000 per 
year—cannot be offset by their procompetitive benefits.162  
                                                                                                     
 156. Complaint at 1, Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 14-cv-02758-CW, (D.N.J. Mar. 
17, 2014). 
  157. Id. at 2. 
 158. Id. at 3. 
 159. See Michael McCann, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/McCannSportsLaw/ 
status/499581988656140288 (Aug. 13, 2014) (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) 
(tweeting that “[t]op sports lawyer Alan Milstein: O’Bannon ruling doesn’t help 
Jeffrey Kessler lawsuit, which ‘is doomed for failure’”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 160. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, O’Bannon v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C 09–3329 CW, 2014 WL 3899815, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 8, 2014) (explaining that the agreement among schools to attribute zero 
value to a student-athlete’s name, image, and likeness harms the student-
athlete and creates an anticompetitive effect).   
 161. See id. at *36 (“Although the rules do yield some limited procompetitive 
benefits by marginally increasing consumer demand for the NCAA’s product and 
improving the educational services provided to student-athletes, plaintiffs have 
identified less restrictive ways of achieving these benefits.”).  
 162. See Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 3:14-cv-01678 (D.N.J. 
complaint filed Mar. 17, 2014) (alleging that the ceiling on athlete pay created 
by NCAA restrictions is a pernicious and blatant violation of antitrust law, 
which has no legitimate procompetitive justification).  
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The Jenkins plaintiffs further enjoy the benefit of learning 
from the mistakes the O’Bannon plaintiffs made in strategizing 
their case. While the O’Bannon plaintiffs produced no meaningful 
evidence to rebut the NCAA expert’s findings of an inverse 
correlation between athlete pay and consumer demand, the 
Jenkins plaintiffs will have a fresh opportunity to commission an 
expert report to rebut these findings.163 If the Jenkins plaintiffs 
are able to produce meaningful evidence to rebut the presumption 
of an inverse correlation between athlete pay and consumer 
interest in college sports, it could reasonably lead to the 
conclusion that the NCAA’s amateurism rules do not aid 
consumer demand and thus have no procompetitive virtue.164 In 
such an event, a court might ultimately overturn the NCAA’s 
restraints outright. 
Beyond Jenkins, a slightly different legal theory under which 
a plaintiff could challenge the NCAA “no pay” rules may allege 
that the NCAA rules that prevent college athletes from endorsing 
products restrain trade in various sports celebrity endorsement 
markets.165 A challenge of this nature might also allege that the 
NCAA’s restraints in endorsement markets lead to windfall 
profits for college coaches who, based upon these restraints, do 
not have to compete against their own athletes for 
endorsement/promotional opportunities within their local college 
communities.166 Although the court in O’Bannon did not order 
                                                                                                     
 163. See O’Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815 at *11 (noting that the plaintiffs did 
not produce a rebuttal report to Dr. Dennis’s report, which indicated an inverse 
correlation between college–athlete pay and fan interest).  
 164. Cf. Lazaroff, supra note 93, at 359–60 (suggesting that a potential 
source for such evidence may arise from a showing that even when “illicit 
payments in violation of NCAA regulation have been uncovered repeatedly over 
the years . . . [such] violations of NCAA amateurism rules . . . have not 
diminished student, faculty, or alumni support for successful college football or 
basketball teams”); Sherman Act Note, supra note 100, at 1313 (suggesting that 
“[c]onsumer demand for college sports does not decline when violations of the 
rule are exposed,” and that “the quality of the sports programs and the athletes’ 
affiliations with educational institutions appear to be the only two factors that 
affect consumer demand for college sports”). 
 165. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text (explaining the drastic 
difference between the compensation available to student-athletes after 
O’Bannon and the compensation that would be available if student-athletes 
could endorse products).  
 166. See Edelman, supra note 122, at 862 (arguing that because student-
athletes are not paid, the salaries and endorsement opportunities offered to 
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deregulation of the third-party endorsement markets, a 
subsequent lawsuit under this theory might achieve a more 
favorable result if the plaintiffs are able to show that some 
businesses would seek to hire college-athlete endorsers if they 
were not precluded from doing so by the NCAA bylaws.167 
Furthermore, a direct challenge to the NCAA rules 
forbidding college athletes from endorsing products is likely to 
succeed on its antitrust merits because the NCAA could not easily 
argue that there are any procompetitive benefits to restraining 
third-party endorsement markets. It would be difficult for the 
NCAA to argue that a free market for college athletes endorsing 
products would harm consumer demand for attending college 
sporting events because other sporting events such as the 
Olympic Games have not lost popularity after beginning to allow 
athletes to endorse third-party products. In addition, allowing 
college athletes to endorse third-party products would not 
necessarily lead to athlete disengagement from the broader 
educational community, as many college students who are 
famous for pursuits other than sports currently endorse products 
without it interfering with their overall college experience. 
D. Impact of the O’Bannon Ruling on College-Athlete Unionizing 
and Title IX Compliance 
The ruling in O’Bannon simultaneously creates a possibility 
for changes in legal strategies pertaining to college-athlete 
unionizing efforts and Title IX compliance.168 In terms of 
unionizing, from the players’ perspective the O’Bannon decision 
                                                                                                     
coaches are disproportionality high); see also id. at 874 (“Since student-athletes 
are not allowed to profit from their skills, men’s college basketball revenues 
create a windfall of payments to league administrators, directors, and 
coaches.”).  
 167. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, O’Bannon v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C 09–3329 CW, 2014 WL 3899815 at *17 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (rejecting the third alleged less restrictive alternative of 
allowing for a free market for college athletes to sell their services to third 
parties).  
 168. See infra notes 169–81 and accompanying text (discussing the potential 
benefits student-athletes may appreciate if they unionize and discussing why 
Title IX claims are unlikely to succeed). 
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could discourage such efforts based on an earnest belief that 
antitrust law, and not labor law, is the best way to secure 
financial gains.169 Although the permanent injunction issued in 
O’Bannon creates only an immediate upside of modest financial 
gains, FBS football and Division I men’s basketball players may 
look to the upcoming Jenkins litigation as the potential case that 
could break meaningful ground toward a free market for college 
athletes’ services.170 
By contrast, some NCAA leaders may view the O’Bannon 
ruling as creating a stronger basis to support the FBS football 
players and Division I men’s basketball players unionizing efforts 
as long as these efforts occur as part of a multiemployer 
bargaining unit.171 The reason being, if college football and men’s 
basketball players unionize as part of a multiemployer 
bargaining unit, the NCAA would incur an immediate obligation 
to bargain with these athletes over the mandatory terms and 
conditions of employment—hours, wages, and general working 
conditions.172 This, in turn, would grant the NCAA the benefit of 
antitrust law’s non-statutory labor exemption—thus allowing for 
collective bargaining over athlete pay without the risk of any 
further antitrust liability.173  
                                                                                                     
 169. See infra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing how if the players 
unionize, it may take away their rights under antitrust law based on the non-
statutory labor exemption). See generally Lazaroff, supra note 13 (concluding 
that if college athletes are permitted to unionize by the National Labor 
Relations Board, “the non-statutory labor exemption will come into play”). 
 170. See supra notes 156–64 and accompanying text (describing the Jenkins 
lawsuit). 
 171. See infra notes 172–73 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits 
of unionizing). 
 172. See N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 
(1958) (explaining that the National Labor Relations Act establishes “the 
obligation of the employer and the representative of its employees to bargain 
with each other in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment”). The Court further reasoned that “[t]he duty is 
limited to those subjects, and within that area neither party is legally obligated 
to yield.” Id. 
 173. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237 (1996) (recognizing 
an exemption from antitrust laws when unionized employees bargain in good 
faith with their employers over hours, wages, and working conditions). This 
“exemption recognizes that, to give effect to federal labor laws and policies and 
to allow meaningful collective bargaining to take place, some restraints on 
competition imposed through the bargaining process must be shielded from 
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Meanwhile, in terms of Title IX compliance, some NCAA 
members currently may be reluctant to raise scholarship levels to 
the true cost of attendance for only FBS football and men’s 
basketball players based on the fear of lawsuits challenging this 
practice under Title IX.174 Indeed, if certain colleges increase 
their scholarship amounts to the true cost of attendance for male 
college athletes but not for female athletes, this pricing practice 
may very well present some Title IX risk. 
Nevertheless, the risk of an NCAA member school violating 
Title IX by “paying” its athletes a share of their name, image and 
likeness revenues should be viewed as substantially lower than 
simply offering unequal scholarship amounts—especially if 
colleges pay different amounts to athletes based on the actual 
free market value for their services/likenesses.175 In past court 
decisions, Title IX’s requirements as related to equal pay have 
been generally interpreted as “coextensive with the 
antidiscrimination provisions that appear in the Equal Pay Act of 
1963 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”176 Thus, disparate pay for 
male and female athletes is likely permissible under Title IX as 
long as the male athletes’ job descriptions involve greater skill, 
effort, or responsibility than the female athletes’ job 
descriptions.177  
                                                                                                     
antitrust sanctions.” Id. Further, the Court explained that the non-statutory 
labor exemption arises because “as a matter of logic, it would be difficult . . . to 
require groups of employers and employees to bargain together, but at the same 
time to forbid them to make . . . any of the competition-restricting agreements 
potentially necessary to make the process work or its results mutually 
acceptable.” Id.  
 174. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§1681–
1688 (2012) (discussing obligations of equal educational opportunities for 
students, irrespective of their gender). 
 175. See infra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (discussing why the risk 
of a Title IX claim based on disparate pay between male and female athletes is 
unlikely to succeed). 
 176. Edelman, supra note 13, at 1051; see John Gaal et al., Gender-Based 
Pay Disparities in Intercollegiate Coaching: The Legal Issues, 28 J.C. & U.L. 
519, 545 (2002) (explaining that “the few courts that have addressed Title IX as 
an independent employment discrimination statute in the context of [college] 
coaches’ compensation have not viewed it as any broader than the [Equal Pay 
Act] . . . .”); Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that the plaintiff’s Title IX claim fails for the same reasons as her 
Equal Pay Act claim fails).   
 177. Thus, disparate compensation of male and female student-athletes 
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Based on the foregoing, there is a reasonable argument that 
if individual athletes were to receive a salary or stipend based on 
the economic value they generate for their particular athletic 
programs, FBS football and Division I men’s basketball players’ 
jobs would be found to involve greater skill, effort and 
responsibility than the jobs of their non-revenue producing 
counterparts in other sports.178 The case that seems to best 
support the point is Stanley v. University of Southern 
California.179 There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit rejected a motion to enjoin the University of Southern 
California from providing higher pay to its men’s basketball coach 
than its female coach on the ground that the revenues generated 
by the men’s basketball team is “90 times greater than the 
revenue generated by the women’s basketball team.”180 Although 
                                                                                                     
would be permissible under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 as 
long as the male student-athletes’ job descriptions involved greater skill, effort, 
and responsibility than the female student-athletes’ job descriptions. Edelman, 
supra note 13, at 1051.  
 178. See id. at 1052 (arguing that male student-athletes’ jobs indeed involve 
greater skill, effort, and responsibility for purposes of pay discrimination laws 
because male student-athletes in football and men’s basketball typically 
generate substantially higher revenues for their colleges from the use of their 
names and likenesses than do female student-athletes”); see also Jon Gaal et al., 
supra note 176, at 527 (“Courts have recognized that differences in revenue 
production and media expectations can provide evidence of a difference in 
responsibilities sufficient to preclude a finding of ‘equal work.’”); Stanley v. 
Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The responsibility to 
produce a large amount of revenue is evidence of a substantial difference in 
responsibility.”); Jacobs v. Coll. of William & Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. 
Va. 1980), aff’d without opinion, 661 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that the 
obligation to produce revenue demonstrates that coaching jobs are not 
substantially equal).   
 179. 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 180. Id. at 1321. Furthermore, as previously noted in my Oregon Law 
Review Article The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win 
for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports: 
[I]t is worth noting that the NCAA’s alleged concerns about the 
gender pay gap seem disingenuous in light of various NCAA 
members’ longstanding practices of allowing for a wide pay gap 
between male and female coaches, even in sports where differences in 
revenue generation would not justify such a distinction. A 2001 
Chronicle of Higher Education survey on the gender pay gap in 
college sports found that the disparity in pay among college athletic 
coaches was far greater than the disparity in society overall.  
Meanwhile, statistics accumulated by the Department of Education 
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some Title IX scholars have argued that Stanley was wrongly 
decided,181 the case remains good law in the Ninth Circuit—one of 
the federal circuits that is perceived as adopting a more liberal 
interpretation to Civil Rights statutes such as Title IX. 
E. Potential NCAA Advocacy Before Congress for a Statutory 
Antitrust Exemption 
Finally, the recent ruling in O’Bannon is likely to increase 
the NCAA’s efforts to lobby Congress for a statutory exemption 
from federal antitrust law.182 As has previously been noted in 
various academic writings, “[t]he unique nature of the NCAA as a 
bottom-up organization composed of politically powerful 
universities makes it into a prime candidate to seek special 
                                                                                                     
from 2003 to 2010 show that the average salary for NCAA Division I 
men’s team coaches increased sixty-seven percent, whereas the salary 
for women’s team coaches increased just sixteen percent. In the 
context of the gender disparity of college coaches’ pay, the NCAA has 
remained largely silent.  
Edelman, supra note 13, at 1052–53. 
 181. See, e.g., Erin Buzuvis, More Thoughts on the Title IX Question, TITLE 
IX BLOG (Mar. 28, 2014), http://title-ix.blogspot.com/2014/03/more-thoughts-on-
title-ix-question-in.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 182. See Eben Novy-Williams & Erik Matuszewski, NCAA Escape from 
Court Loss Seen Resting in Antitrust Exemption, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 11, 2014 
12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-11/ncaa-escape-from-court-
loss-seen-resting-in-antitrust-exemption.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) 
(discussing the possibility of NCAA members lobbying Congress for a special 
statutory antitrust exemption) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from Illegal 
Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally 
Restrains Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 659 (2009) (explaining that 
independent businesses may concertedly petition Congress to change the law 
without risking an antitrust violation based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 
which allows competing businesses to join together for the purposes of 
influencing government action, even if the underlying goal is one that is to 
restrain competition); Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 240 (referencing a 2007 
monograph produced by the American Bar Association, which notes that there 
are more than twenty statutory exemptions from federal antitrust law). These 
exemptions generally fall into three broad categories: “(1) natural monopoly, 
(2) market and institutional failures of various kinds, or (3) subsidy for some 
socially desired activity or wealth transfer to some socially preferred group.” Id. 
at 241. 
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legislation in its favor.”183 Moreover, Congress has a history of 
passing special legislation to protect the NCAA’s interests to the 
detriment of college athletes.184 For example, on September 9, 
2004, Congress passed the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust 
Act (SPARTA),185 which indoctrinated into law aspects of the 
NCAA bylaws that prevented sports agents from providing 
anything of value to student athletes.186 
Lobbying efforts for an NCAA antitrust exemption might 
seek either a broad based exemption (seeking complete insulation 
from any collective agreements ranging in topic from television 
broadcast rights to coaches’ compensation) or a narrow exemption 
(addressing only a specific aspect of NCAA business, such as 
athlete pay).187 Among the more recent proposals for granting 
                                                                                                     
 183. Edelman, supra note 33, at 418; see also Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 
237–38 (discussing various past suggestions for crafting an antitrust exemption 
to protect the NCAA). 
 184. See, e.g., infra note 185 and accompanying text (providing an example 
of legislation that protects NCAA interests and harms student-athletes). 
 185. 15 U.S.C. § 7802(a)(1)(B) (2012).  
 186. Id.; see also Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of the UAAA 
and SPARTA: How America Should Reform Its Sports Agent Laws to Conform 
with True Agency Principles, 4 J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 178 (2013) (discussing 
remedies under SPARTA).  
In terms of remedies, SPARTA provided a cause of action to just 
about every party other than the athletes. SPARTA granted the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) authority to enforce the act as if it 
were part and parcel to the FTC Act. In addition, it permitted state 
attorney general[s] to bring suit against sports agents under the act, 
either in the same capacity as the FTC, or on behalf of its residents if 
the attorney general could show that the agent had threatened or 
adversely affected a resident’s interest. Meanwhile, SPARTA even 
allowed NCAA member schools to sue sports agents under the act if 
they could show that a sports agent’s conduct resulted in expenses to 
the NCAA including ‘losses resulting from penalties, disqualification, 
suspension and/or restitution for losses suffered due to self-imposed 
compliance actions.’  
Id. (citation omitted).  
 187. See Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 239 (explaining that “[a] broadly drafted 
antitrust exemption for the NCAA could undoubtedly shield it and its members 
from any real threat of Sherman Act liability”). In contrast, “a more limited 
exemption would provide some relief from the steady stream of litigation, which 
creates expense and uncertainty about the validity of NCAA business practices.” 
Id. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221–22 (1940) 
(noting that Congress does not provide the Court with discretion to preserve 
certain price-fixing restraints on social policy grounds, and thus if an industry 
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NCAA member schools a narrow exemption, Marquette Law 
School professor Matthew Mitten and Pennsylvania State Law 
School professor Stephen F. Ross suggested, in a 2014 Oregon 
Law Review Article, that Congress should grant an antitrust 
exemption to any college that is willing to submit voluntarily to 
the authority of “an independent federal regulatory commission, 
which would provide an inclusive and transparent rule-making 
process.”188 
Nevertheless, even if Congress were able to exempt the 
NCAA from antitrust law, it would be misguided for Congress to 
do so.189 Insulating the NCAA, even in part, from antitrust law 
would “chill individual NCAA members’ ability to make 
independent decisions from the NCAA majority and thus would 
prevent gradual reform movements within the institution.”190 It 
further may “slow (if not freeze) the process of individual member 
schools implementing stipends to improve the standard of living 
for student-athletes.”191  
                                                                                                     
seeks special exemption from antitrust law, it needs to seek congressional 
action). 
 188. See Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better 
Promote the Educational Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV. 837, 844 (2014) (“Although the commission’s rules 
would not be legal mandates, their voluntary adoption by the NCAA and its 
member institutions would immunize anticompetitive restraints in connection 
with big-time college sports from judicial scrutiny under federal and state 
antitrust laws.”).   
 189. See infra notes 190–93 and accompanying text (discussing the problems 
with an NCAA exemption from antitrust law); see also Lazaroff, supra note 13, 
at 239–45 (discussing potential rationales behind an antitrust exemption for the 
NCAA).  
The $64,000 question is reduced to this: does any acceptable rationale 
for a legislative antitrust exemption really further the case for giving 
one to the NCAA? I think not. . . . The NCAA is the dominant player 
in intercollegiate athletics, possessing great bargaining power in 
purchasing the raw ingredients for and selling its athletic product. 
Id. at 245; see also Edelman, supra note 33, at 418 (concluding that “[e]ven 
though Congress has the power to pass a statute that safeguards the 
NCAA ‘death penalty,’ it would be misguided for Congress to do so”). 
 190. Edelman, supra note 33, at 418.  
 191. Id.; see also Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 246 (“In sum, any blanket 
[antitrust] exemption for the NCAA would allow colleges and universities to 
keep money that a competitive market would put in the pockets of others. One 
might call the result a ‘reverse Robin Hood effect,’ where the rich get richer and 
the have-nots continue to struggle.”). 
2362 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319 (2014) 
Finally, an administrative solution to regulate college sports 
such as the one suggested by Professors Ross and Mitten still 
ignores the overwhelming political power that the NCAA already 
exercises over the U.S. government.192 It further ignores the 
general view that consumers are best protected from 
anticompetitive conduct by free market solutions rather than 
bureaucratic remedies.193 
Even Professors Ross and Mitten seem to recognize the 
implicit drawbacks to using administrative solutions to regulate 
sports leagues rather than antitrust law. Professor Mitten writes 
in his 2000 law review article, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA 
Regulation of ‘Big Time’ College Athletics, that the commercial 
business practices of the NCAA ideally should be held subject to 
antitrust law because “[t]here is no valid justification for 
permitting the NCAA to determine arbitrarily the permissible 
degree of economic competition among its members.”194 
Meanwhile, Professor Ross concludes in his seminal 1989 article 
Monopoly Sports Leagues that it would be better to break up 
Major League Baseball and the National Football League than to 
allow for administrative regulation of these leagues because 
“those officials assigned to regulate the sports industry soon may 
                                                                                                     
 192. See Mitten & Ross, supra note 188, at 844 (discussing an 
administrative law proposal to regulate college sports); see also Greg Johnson, 
Lawmaker Challenges NCAA on Tax Exemption, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2006), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/oct/06/sports/sp-ncaa6 (last visited Nov. 18, 
2014) (quoting professor Gary Roberts, one of the leading authorities on sports 
law in the United States, as describing the political power of the NCAA and 
college sports as “unbelievable”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 193. See Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 247–48 (comparing a blanket antitrust 
exemption for the NCAA to “leaving the fox free to devour its prey”); Edelman, 
supra note 33, at 402–19 (discussing the importance of treating the NCAA 
identically to other business associations with market power). See Brown v. Pro 
Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 252 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“[t]he basic premise underlying the Sherman Act is the assumption that free 
competition among business entities will produce the best price levels,” and that 
“[c]ollusion among competitors, it is believed, may produce prices that harm 
consumers”); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (concluding 
that “the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best 
allocation of our economic resources”). 
 194. Matthew Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulations of ‘Big 
Time’ College Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century 
Ideals of Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 1, 8 (2000). 
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become ‘captured’ by the very owners that they supposedly are 
regulating.”195 
VII. Conclusion 
The district court’s recent ruling in O’Bannon v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association was, at once, both pioneering and 
mundane. The decision was pioneering to the extent that it was 
among the first to recognize that certain restraints on college-
athlete pay may violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.196 In 
addition, the ruling established both a limited free market for 
college athletes’ services197 and important legal precedent to 
facilitate future antitrust challenges to other aspects of the 
NCAA’s bylaws.198 
Nevertheless, the O’Bannon ruling was also mundane 
because it failed to establish a true free market for college-athlete 
services, and it failed to grant college athletes with legal 
protection to license the rights to their names, images, and 
likenesses to third parties.199 Although the court in O’Bannon had 
the opportunity to fully enjoin the NCAA’s restraints on student-
athlete pay, it instead elected to only enjoin those aspects of the 
NCAA rules that prevent colleges from providing athletes with 
the full cost of attendance to a school plus up to $5,000 per year 
via trust fund.200 While some legal scholars describe this 
injunction as helping to “split the baby,” antitrust jurisprudence 
is not supposed to be about creating compromises donned in 
social policy.201 It is supposed to protect consumers and free 
markets.  
                                                                                                     
 195. Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 702–
03, 755 (1989) (noting that “[b]aseball and football are not natural monopolies; 
two or more rival leagues can compete in each sport,” and “[t]he existence of 
rival leagues would solve most of these economic problems [associated with 
professional sports]”). 
 196. Supra Part III. 
 197. Supra Part III. 
 198. Supra Part IV. 
 199. Supra Part V. 
 200. Supra Part III. 
 201. Ken Belson, What the O’Bannon Ruling Means for Colleges and Players, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/ sports/what-the-
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Consequently, the O’Bannon decision—albeit an important 
step in the quest for improving college athletes’ economic rights—
will likely not serve as the last word in determining the legal 
status of concerted restraints on college-athlete pay. Subsequent 
lawsuits are likely to attempt to use the favorable language in 
O’Bannon to further carve away at the NCAA’s limits on free 
market compensation for college athletes.202 Meanwhile, NCAA 
leaders are likely to attempt to overturn the O’Bannon decision 
through either a successful appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit or a petition for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court.203 At the same time, the NCAA may lobby Congress for an 
antitrust exemption to limit the viability of future athlete 
lawsuits against the NCAA.204 
At the end of the day, Judge Wilken’s decision in O’Bannon v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association will likely be 
memorialized as the decision that resurrected the legal argument 
that the NCAA “no pay” rules may violate section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. Even though the O’Bannon case failed to establish 
a true free market for college athletes’ services, it created a 
blueprint for future lawyers to attempt to use antitrust law to 
obtain that very result. 
                                                                                                     
obannon-ruling-means-for-colleges-and-players.html?_r=0 (last visited Nov. 18, 
2014) (quoting New York University Professor of Sports Management Robert 
Boland) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 202. Supra Part IV. 
 203. Supra Part VI.A. 
 204. Supra Part VI.E.  
